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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Political Refugees: A Study in
Selective Compassion
[W]hether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether
they may have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-semitism or
anti-catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress . . . the
underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall be allowed to
enter are for Congress exclusively to determine, even though such
determination may be deemed to offend American traditions.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A persistent theme of American political tradition has been
that the Republic has always opened its doors in welcome to the
homeless, persecuted and oppressed of other lands. Offically, the
Department of State is deeply committed to the principle of asy-
lum,2 and to the tenet that "[i]f the Department considers that,
in any individual case, there is any doubt concerning the safe return
of an applicant to his [or her] homeland, we will err on the side of
the applicant and recommend that he be allowed to remain in the
United States."
'3
A study of both administrative' and court decisions involving
the issue of asylum reveals, however, that the claimant bears a
heavy burden of proof in demonstrating to the satisfaction of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service [hereinafter INS], or the
1. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2. The word does not appear in the Immigration and Nationality Act. As defined by the
general counsel for the Immigration and Naturalization Service [hereinafter INS],
(ilt is the grant of a temporary haven. . . to those in fear of persecution because
of race, religion or political opinion, and is inherent in the United Nations Conven-
tion on Refugees to which the United States is a signatory. The grant is accorded
under the appropriate vehicle available under the immigration laws.
Presentation of Sam Bernsen, Seminar of American Branch, International Law Association
(Nov. 15, 1975), reprinted in 52 INTERPRETER RELEAsEs 407, 410 (1975). This note is concerned
with "asylum" as used in the sense described above.
3. Presentation of James L. Carlin, Annual Conference of the Association of Immigration
and Nationality Lawyers, in San Francisco (April 27-May 1, 1976), reprinted in 53
INTERPRETER RELEASES 149, 152 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Carlin].
4. It should be noted that not all decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals are
published. Applicable regulations provide only that "[tihe decision of the Board shall be in
writing and copies thereof shall be transmitted by the Board to the Service and a copy shall
be served upon the alien . 5..." 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(f) (1977).
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State Department, that his fear of persecution is a valid one. While
classification as a refugee5 under United States law is no small
achievement for any applicant, certain assumptions operate to prej-
udice the claims of political refugees from non-communist countries
and to facilitate the claims of escapees from communist-dominated
states.
The unspoken assumption that an escapee from a communist-
dominated state is by definition a political refugee while a person
fleeing another form of government is more likely an opportunist,
has had serious consequences in many immigration cases where
asylum is requested. This comment will discuss limitations inherent
in the structure of the Immigration and Nationality Acts
[hereinafter the Act] and provide a comparative analysis of deci-
sions of the Board of Immigration Appeals [hereinafter the Board]
and the courts, demonstrating different standards for the two
classes of refugees.
I. LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN THE STRucTURE OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT
The Act neither defines the word "refugee," nor does it provide
specifically for political asylum as a matter of right. It does, how-
ever, set forth limited procedures whereby a person fleeing political
persecution may enter or remain in the United States. Two of the
provisions, conditional entry and parole, are used to admit persons
who would otherwise be excludable for lack of proper documenta-
tion. A third, waiver of deportation, may provide relief for persons
within the United States who have been determined to be deport-
able.7
5. The INS, in 8 C.F.R. § 223a.1 (1977), has adopted the definition of "refugee" con-
tained in Article 1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (as modified by Article I of the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577,
606 U.N.T.S. 267) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Refugee Convention & Protocol]. Article I of
the Convention, as incorporated in and amended by the Protocol, defines a refugee as any
person who "[ojwing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the coun-
try of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country .... Id. art. I.
6. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970) as amended
[hereinafter cited as the Act].
7. The regulations also contain a provision which specifically relates to alien crewmen:
Any alien crewman refused a conditional landing permit or whose conditional land-
ing permit has been revoked who alleges that he cannot return to a Communist,
Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied country because of fear of persec-
tuion [sic] in that country on account of race, religion or political opinion shall be
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A. Conditional Entry
Under Section 203(a) (7) of the Act,8 the Attorney General of the
United States' may, in his discretion, grant conditional entry to
individuals fleeing persecution. This section, requiring a flight re-
sulting from actual or anticipated persecution, is available only to
refugees from communist or communist-dominated countries, or
countries within the general area of the Middle East."0 As a result,
this section cannot be invoked by any refugee from Africa or the
Indo-Pakistani subcontinent nor was it initially available to refu-
gees from any country in the Western Hemisphere. The 1976
amendment to the Act extends the application of Section 203(a)(7)
removed from the vessel or aircraft for interrogation. Following the interrogation,
the district director having jurisdiction . may in his discretion authorize parole
of the alien crewman into the United States under the provisions of § 212(d)(5) of
the Act ....
8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f) (1977).
Additionally, the amendment to § 212(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1182(e)) permits the Attorney General to waive the two year foreign residency require-
ment for persons previously admitted to the United States as non-immigrants for study or
research under § 101(a)(15)(J) of the Act where the alien cannot return to the country of his
nationality or last residence because he would be subject to persecution on account of race,
religion or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1970), as amended by Immigration and
Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-484, Title VI, § 601(a), (c), (d), 90 Stat.
2301.
Finally, although there is no reference to asylum in the Act, certain procedures for
requesting it are outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 108 (1977).
8. Section 203(a)(7) (8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970)), as amended by Immigration and
Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 4, 90 Stat. 2705, states:
[clonditional entries shall next be made available by the Attorney General, pur-
suant to such regulations as he may prescribe and in a number not to exceed 6 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a)(ii) of this title, to aliens who
satisfy an Immigration and Naturalization Service officer at an examination in any
non-Communist or non-Communist-dominated country, (A) that (i) because of
persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion
they have fled (I) from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area,
or (II) from any country within the general area of the Middle East, and (ii) are
unable or unwilling to return to such country or area on account of race, religion,
or political opinion, and (iii) are not nationals of the countries or areas in which
their application for conditional entry is made; or (B) that they are persons up-
rooted by catastrophic natural calamity as defined by the President who are unable
to return to their usual place of abode . . . .
The scope of this comment does not include the latter provision on natural catastrophe as it
is not related to the issue of political persecution.
9. By administrative regulation, the authority of the Attorney General is delegated to
the District Director of the INS. 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(n) (1977).
10. The Act defines the Middle East as, "the area between and including (1) Libya on
the west, (2) Turkey on the north, (3) Pakistan on the east, and (4) Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia
on the south." 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970), as amended by Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 4, 90 Stat. 2705. In Patel, 13 I. & N. Dec. 113
(1968), it was held that Kenya is not within the Middle East under the section.
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to the Western Hemisphere," but only Cubans, as nationals of the
sole communist nation in the hemisphere, may enter under this
section.
Procedures for obtaining a conditional entry permit indicate
that Congress and the Immigration and Naturalization Service as-
sume that political refugee status is, as a practical matter, synony-
mous with flight from a communist state.'" The refugee must estab-
lish, for example, that the application is made in a non-communist
or non-communist-dominated country." Administrative regulations
provide that applications for conditional entry be made only from
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lebanon or
Hong Kong." With the exception of Lebanon, the geographic prox-
imity of communist nations to these countries suggests that they
were chosen to facilitate the entry procedure for escapees from East-
ern Europe, the Soviet Union and China. Conditional entry, then,
is virtually useless to refugees from non-communist states."
B. Parole
The Attorney General also, in his discretion, may allow the
parole of individuals lacking proper documentation into the United
States." Although the relief available under the parole provision of
11. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 2, 90
Stat. 2703, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
12. Procedures and requirements for application for asylum are described in Evans, The
Political Refugee in United States Immigration Law and Practice, 3 INT'L LAW. 204 (1969).
13. Section 203(a)(7) of the Act (8 U.S.C. j 1153(a)(7)) provides in pertinent part that
conditional entry visas will be made available to "aliens who satisfy an [INS] officer at an
examination in any non-Communist or non-Communist-dominated country.. ." that their
claims are meritorious. This requirement, taken together with the limitations on the countries
from which application can be made (see note 14 infra and accompanying text), raises the
inference that the claimant will have fled a communist country prior to making his asylum
claim.
14. "Applications for conditional entry may be filed only by aliens who are physically
present within one of the designated countries." Inspection of Persons Applying For Admis-
sion: Conditional Entries, 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(a) (1977).
15. Refugees from non-communist countries may apply under the provision only if they
are from countries which fall within the somewhat arbitrary definition of the Middle East.
See note 10 supra.
16. The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for
reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to
the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admis-
sion of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the
Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned
to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to
be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.
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the Act is not limited in theory, it is limited in fact. Originally
intended as a remedy in individual hardship cases,'7 the parole
power has been used to admit large groups of refugees during the
last twenty years. In each instance, the President, not the Attorney
General, decided whether to admit these groups. After the 1956
October uprising in Hungary, President Eisenhower directel that
the Attorney General exercise the parole power to admit some
15,000 Hungarians;'8 in 1961, President Kennedy initiated a pro-
gram for the entry of great numbers of Cubans" and the following
year he again exercised this power in admitting Chinese fleeing the
mainland;" following the fall of Saigon in 1975, President Ford au-
thorized the entry of Indochinese refugees;' and, most recently,
President Carter authorized Attorney General Bell to exercise the
parole power to admit 2,000 additional Indochinese refugees per
month." Although humanitarian concerns undoubtedly inhered in
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970).
17. On the intent of Congress in drafting the parole provision, see Comment, Refugee-
Parolee: The Dilemna of the Indo-China Refugee, 13 SAN DIEo L. Rzv. 175 (1975). Originally,
the Act restricted the parole remedy to those aliens who required medical treatment in the
United States. The House Report states that:
broader discretionary authority is necessary to permit the Attorney General to
parole inadmissable aliens into the United States in emergency cases, such as the
case of an alien who requires immediate medical attention. . . and in cases where
it is strictly in the public interest to have an inadmissable alien present in the
United States, such as, for instance, a witness or for purposes of prosecution.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1653,
1706 (1952). A further indication of the intent of the drafters was the statement of one of the
members of the committee, Rep. Michael Feighen, who said: "it [the parole statute] was
intended as a remedy for individual hardship cases, no more, no less." HousE SUsCOMM. ON
IMMIGRATION AND NATURAUZATION OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY OF POPULATION AND
IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS, Ser. 13, 88th Cong., 2d Seas. 160 (1964) [hereinafter cited as House
SUBCOMM. REP.].
Finally, in 1965, the Senate Committee Report on revisions in the Act r~affirmed that
parole was designed to allow the Attorney General to act only in emergent, i-dividual and
isolated situations, and not for the immigration of classes or groups outside of the limit of
the law. S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Ses8. 17 (1965).
18. Presidential Directive of Dec. 1, 1956, 103 CONG. Rec. 1355 (1957).
19. HOUSE SUBcOMM. REP., supra note 17, at 106. Parole of a large number of Cubans has
worked a hardship on other Western Hemisphere applicants as the INS has, since 1968,
charged more than 290,000 such Cuban refugees to the Western Hemisphere quota, thereby
reducing the number of visas available to other persons. In 1976 the Attorney General ordered
that Cubans not be charged to the Western Hemisphere quota, but in the case of Silva v.
Levy, No. 76-C-4268 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1976) plaintiffs contended that in spite of this policy
change, the Attorney General had failed to make available to the plaintiffs, Western Hemi-
sphere applicants for permanent resident visas, the thousands of visa numbers charged to the
Western Hemisphere quota between 1968 and Oct. 1, 1976 on behalf of Cuban refugees.
20. 46 DsP'T STATE BULL. 994 (1962).
21. 33 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 839 (1975).
22. NEWSWEEK, April 17, 1978, at 70.
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these situations, these presidential decisions were reflective of and
intimately connected with United States foreign policy during the
relevant periods.2 Moreover, the mere fact that these programs in-
volved so many individuals creates substantial doubt as to whether
each individual was required to present evidence of actual or antici-
pated persecution.2
Significantly, the parole power has never been used to admit a
comparable number of refugees fleeing non-communist dictator-
ships. The most glaring omission in recent years has been the dis-
tinct lack of a meaningful program of parole for the thousands of
refugees from Chile following the overthrow of President Allende by
the military junta in September of 1973.2 Immediately after the
coup, the Department of State maintained that no Chileans had
applied for asylum.2N In hearings before the Senate Subcommittee
on Refugees, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American
Affairs revealed, however, that no Chileans had sought refuge at the
American Embassy at the outbreak of violence because the United
States government does not ordinarily grant diplomatic asylum in
its embassies abroad.Y Those who felt themselves endangered went
elsewhere.2m
The Department of State informed the Subcommittee that a
23. Foreign policy and humanitarian concerns have always been intertwined. For exam-
ple, President Eisenhower sent a special message to Congress on Jan. 31, 1957, in which he
stated:
[tjhousands of men, women, and children have fled their homes to escape Com-
munist oppression. They seek asylum in countries that are free. Their opposition
to Communist tyranny is evidence of a growing resistance throughout the world.
Our position of world leadership demands that, in partnership with the other na-
tions of the free world, we be in a position to grant that asylum.
Cited in Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d 824, 835 n.3 (6th Cir. 1970). In a letter to the President of
the Senate o'i July 21, 1961, President Kennedy was more explicit: "[t]he successful re-
establishment of refugees. . . is importantly related to free world political objectives. These
objectives are: (a) continuation of the provision of asylum and friendly assistance to the
oppressed and persecuted; (b) the extension of hope and encouragement to the victims of
communism and other forms of despotism ...." 46 DEP'T STATE BULL. 104 (1962).
24. In excess of 600,000 Cubans and 130,000 Indochinese have been admitted under
parole. 53 INTEmrs Rim RELzAsEs 149, 150 (1976).
25. Salvador Allende was elected President of Chile on September 4, 1970, as the candi-
date of the Unidad Popular. R. SANFoan, THm MuntoEi OF ALLENDE AND THE END OF THE
CHnILAN WAY To SocIAusM 67 (1975).
26. Hearing on Refugee and Humanitarian Problems in Chile Before the Subcomm. to
Investigate the Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Seas. 31 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate Chile Refugee
Subcomm.].
27. Id.
28. Id.
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parole program for Chileans would probably be unnecessary.' How-
ever, witnesses recently returned from Chile, testified that the num-
ber of persons endangered 3O by the Pinochet3l regime potentially
numbered two hundred thousand. 32 More than a year later the State
Department disclosed a denial of entry visas to one hundred twenty
Chileans who had requested them since the military coup.s As its
sole justification for this refusal, the Department representative
stated, "[tjhe United States is not nor can it be responsible for
everything that happens in Latin America. It is not nor was it re-
sponsible for the course of events in Chile. ",3, Yet the United States
had not previously found it necessary to accept responsibility for the
course of events in Hungary, China, or Cuba in order to parole large
numbers of refugees from those countries. The State Department
acknowledged, moreover, that this lack of sympathy for Chilean
refugees was caused, at least in part, by their support of a Marxist
president.3 Hence, many of them may well have been excludable
29. [T~he Department does not believe a parole program for political refugees
is warranted at this time. Chileans in the United States can apply for political
asylum if they fear political persecution were they to return to Chile. Regular
immigration procedures are available for Chileans who might wish to leave Chile
because they disagree with the present regime.
Id. at 32.
30. For an account of the excesses of the Pinochet regime, see R. SANrOan, supra note
25, ch. 6, "The Inferno." In 1976, three years after the coup, the United Nations General
Assembly called on Chile to take all measures to restore basic human rights and fundamental
freedoms. United Nations investigators concluded that "[the enormity of the inroads on
human rights could be judged by the fact that some estimate the total number of arrests and
detentions since [the coup] at approximately 100,000." 13 U.N. Chronicle No. 1 55, 57 (Jan.
1976).
31. General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte led the military coup which overthrew Allende on
September 11, 1973. A. URIBE, THE BLACKBOOK OF AmCAN INTERVENTION iN CHILE 148 (1975).
For a more complete discussion of the events leading up to the coup see Velasco, The Allende
Regime in Chile: An Historical and Legal Analysis (pts. 1-3), 9 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 480, 711,
961 (1976).
32. To the best of our knowledge, there were more than 200,000 members of
the different political parties which composed the Unidad Popular. Some of these
people also held positions of responsibility within the government, ordinarily in
their area of professional expertise. In addition, there were large numbers of politi-
cal independents who continued to work in important positions after the change
from the Frei to the Allende administration. Potential political refugees could come
from any or all of these groups.
Senate Chile Refugee Subcomm.. supra note 26, at 32 (statement of Adam and Pat Garrett-
Schesch).
33. 1974 FACTS oN FiLE Y.B. 520.
34. Id.
35. The State Department concluded its report to the Senate Subcommittee investigat-
ing the Chilean situation with the statement that "(ift is probable that a significant number
of Chilean refugees applying for admission to the United States would be excludable under
Section 212(a)(28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act dealing with the political associa-
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under those provisions of the Act dealing with political associations
and subversives3
Legislators have attempted to provide concrete and substantial
relief for Chileans but proposed bills have encountered staunch crit-
icism from both the State and Justice Departments and ultimately
have died in Committee." On August 3, 1977 Senator Abourezk
recounted the history of attempts to gain relief for Chileans in his
remarks accompanying the introduction of Senate Bill 1995:
The United States has established parole programs for Chileans in
the past; unfortunately they have been limited and largely fruitless
efforts. The first program for heads of families was established in
June 1975, to assist Chileans in Chile. It was not until October 1976
that the first refugees under the program began arriving. The sec-
ond parole program, established in October 1976, is for Chilean
refugees in Argentina. As of this May, no Chilean refugee has
entered the United States under this current program.
These programs have failed primarily because of the long
waiting period from the time of the application to the time of
entry. For example, Chileans who fled to Argentina were told to
register with the Office of the United Nations High Commission
for Refugees before they filed their parole applications.
Unfortunately this office has been burgled twice and the files con-
taining the identity and the location of Chilean refugees stolen.
Several Chileans disappeared after their files were taken. Thus it
is understandable why Chileans are hesitant now to register with
the High Commissioner's office."
The treatment accorded Chileans, as contrasted with that accorded
those groups fleeing communist nations, demonstrates that the rem-
edy of parole continues to be invoked on the basis of political expe-
tions and activities of persons being considered for entry into the United States." Senate
Chile Refugee Subcomm., supra note 26, at 32.
36. As enumerated in § 212(a)(28)(C) of the Act, those political beliefs or activities which
render an alien excludable include:
aliens who are members of or affiliated with (i) the Communist Party of the United
States, (ii) any other totalitarian party of the United States, (iii) the Communist
Political Association, (iv) the Communist or any other totalitarian party of any
State of the United States, [or] of any foreign state,. . . (v) any section, subsidi-
ary, branch, affiliate, or subdivision of any such association or party, or (vi) the
direct predecessors or sucessors of any such association or party, regardless of what
name such group or organization may have used, may now bear, or may hereafter
adopt ....
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a)(28)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(C) (1970)
(emphasis added).
37. 123 CONG. RFc. H2972 (daily ed. April 4, 1977).
38. 123 CONG. Rcc. S13454 (daily ed. August 3, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk) (em-
phasis added).
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diency as perceived by the Executive Branch of the government,
rather than on the basis of individual hardship or persecution.
C. Waiver of Deportation
Aliens within the United States determined to be deportable
may apply for relief in the form of waiver of deportation, the grant-
ing of which is discretionary with the Attorney General."0 This rem-
edy is unavailable to those refugees denied relief under the parole
or conditional entry provisions. They are excludable because they
have not technically effected an "entry" into the United States,
notwithstanding their physical presence here." Although "entry" is
statutorily defined as "any coming of an alien into the United States
S. .2 administrative authority treats the word as a term of art
comprising several elements: "(1) a crossing into the territorial lim-
its of the United States, i.e. physical presence; plus (2) inspection
and admission by an immigration officer . . .; or (3) actual and
intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection point
S..-, coupled with (4) freedom from restraint."' 3 "Entry" is thus
interpreted to mean that an alien is either physically present and
39. The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien
within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be
subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and for such
period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
40. It is the position of the Department of Justice that the Attorney General's determina-
tions in this area are entirely discretionary, subject to a limited review by the courts. Almost
invariably the courts have adopted this approach. Gordon, Summaries of Judicial Decisions,
in IMbHGRATrON AND NATIONALrTY Acr wrm AMENDMENTs AND NOTS ON RsLATED LAws 221, 244
(6th ed. 1969).
41. But see 8 C.F.R. § 108.2. Denial of an asylum claim does not preclude using § 243(h)
of the Act in subsequent expulsion proceedings. Applicants who have been denied are deemed
not to have effected an entry and are therefore subject to exclusion rather than expulsion
(deportation). "[Slection 243(h) is unavailable to excluded aliens, and the fact of parole
creates no variance from this principle." Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193, 196 (1958).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1970) states: [t]he term 'entry' means any coming of an
alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession,
whether voluntarily or otherwise .... "
43. Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (1973) (citations omitted). The result of this classifi-
cation is that those claimants who immediately present themselves to the INS for inspection
are penalized and not permitted to apply for relief in the form of waiver of deportation. Those
who intentionally evade inspection and effect one or more illegal entries may apply for relief
but discretion may possibly not be exercised in their favor on the ground that they have been
dishonest in evading the Service. Hamad v. INS, 420 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"The restraint may take the form of surveillance, unbeknownst to the alien; he has still
not made an entry despite having crossed the border with the intention of evading inspection,
because he lacks the freedom to go at large and mix with the population." Pierre, 14 1. & N.
Dec. at 469, citing Ex Parte Chow Chok, 161 F. 627 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd 163 F. 1021 (2d Cir.
1908).
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officially admitted, or is physically present and has escaped detec-
tion by the authorities. Under either alternative, if one of the ele-
ments is lacking, there is no "entry" and the alien is subject to
exclusion rather than expulsion proceedings.
The legal fiction of entry and the resulting distinction between
excludable and deportable aliens has serious consequences in asy-
lum cases because an excludable alien cannot assert rights under
the United States Constitution." Thus, although Section 243(h) of
the Act is not discriminatory on its face, relief under this provision
is unavailable for the two major classes of refugees provided for in
the Act. Furthermore, as discussed hereinafter, this provision has
been so construed that different standards have evolved with re-
spect to refugees fleeing communist, as opposed to non-communist,
governments.
M. CONSTRUCTMON OF THE STATUTE
While the structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act
tends to deny recognition of bona fide political refugees in non-
communist countries, interpretation and construction of the perti-
nent sections frequently serve to compound the problems of these
refugees.
Since each case is decided on a combination of factors, it is
often difficult to isolate any one fact or circumstance as determina-
tive of the result. However, a close analysis of recurring issues re-
veals a pattern of inconsistencies in reasoning and construction
which are traceable to the nature of the government accused of
persecution, and result in certain assumptions regarding that gov-
ernment by the courts, the administrative law judges, and the State
Department."
44. See notes 131-60 infra and accompanying text.
45. In comparing the decisions involving refugees from communist-dominated states
with those involving non-communist dictatorships, the author does not contend that the
approved applications of refugees from communism were necessarily without merit. Nor does
she contend that aliens claiming to be refugees from communism have never been denied
asylum. Rather, she wishes to demonstrate how the Act and its construction operate in such
a way as to place a great burden on aliens seeking asylum from rightist governments. Consis-
tent with that hypothesis, the cases in which refugees from communist states have been
denied may be accounted for in the following ways: (1) the case predates the change from a
requirement of physical persecution to persecution on account of race, religion, or political
opinion. The requirement of physical persecution was eliminated by amendment of § 11(f)
of the Act by the INA Amendment Act of October 3, 1965, 79 Stat. 918, (amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (1952)). See Batistic v. Pilliod, 286 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1961) and Blazina v. Bou-
chard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1961); (2) the claimant had not sufficiently demonstrated his or
her nascent anti-communist beliefs. See Kerkai v. INS, 418 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1067 (1970), where the court enumerated the communist organizations of
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A. Judicial Review
Theoretically, under any of the pertinent sections," the ambit
of judicial review 7 is limited to deciding whether there has been an
abuse of discretion. ' s In a case denying the claims of a substantial
number of Haitians fleeing the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier,",
the court stated that the "discretionary judgment of a political
department is reviewable by us only for abuse of discretion."'
However, the cases indicate that this standard is not uniformly
applied. In a case involving a Hungarian "freedom fighter," 51 the
court stated,
[biut while the discretion of the courts should not be substituted
for the discretion to be exercised by the Attorney General, as pro-
vided by law, nevertheless, '[w]e do say that there must be a
hearing which will give assurances the discretion of the Attorney
General shall be exercised against a background of facts fairly
contested in the open.' 2
The full testimony of claimant's expert witness, although admitted,
had not, as the court acknowledged, persuaded the Board. Never-
which petitioner had been a member before her arrival from Hungary, and stated that,
"[w]hile she indicates that she did not believe in the Communist Party philosophy, she did
not attempt to withdraw from the Party until 1967, when her request was refused." Id. at
218; (3) the claimant had abused a previous grant of discretionary relief and had not raised
the persecution claim until the last moment. See Antolos v. INS, 402 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1968).
While there is no discussion in Antolos of the factual contentions of the persecution claim, it
is significant that the petitioner had previously been granted voluntary departure and had
failed to depart. His persecution claim was not raised until after an Order to Show Cause
had been issued.
46. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970); Immi-
gration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970); Immigration and
Nationality Act, § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
47. Section 106(a) of the Act (8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)) provides for review of final deportation
orders by petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals, while § 106(b) provides
that final orders of exclusion are reviewable by habeas corpus proceedings in the District
Court and not otherwise. Section 106(a) & (b) were added to the original Act by the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5(a)&(b), 75 Stat. 651
(1961).
48. As noted in Carrasco-Favela v. INS, 563 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1977), "decisions of this
Court indicate that review is limited to determining whether the denial of relief was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion and whether the petitioner was accorded full procedural
due process rights." Id. at 1222 n.5.
49. See Dernis, Haitian Immigrants: Political Refugees or Economic Escapees?, 31 U.
MIAMi L. REv. 27 (1976). Jean-Claude Duvalier became President for Life of Haiti upon
the death in 1971 of his father Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier, the previous President for Life.
50. Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281, 1287 (5th Cir. 1977).
51. Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1970). Ironically, Berdo's initial exclusion was
based on his membership in the Communist Party of Hungary.
52. Id. at 845, citing Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 615 (2d Cir. 1958).
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theless, the court reversed in claimant's favor.5 1
If expanded judicial review has proven insufficient to achieve
the desired result, some courts have gone so far as to ignore prece-
dent. This license is reflected in a recent Second Circuit decision"
wherein a prior case" admittedly on point was rejected. Holding in
favor of petitioner, a refugee from the People's Republic of China,
the court declared: "stare decisis should not govern in a case like
this where a man's life is involved."-"
B. Economic Disadvantage as a Ground for Asylum
A common problem facing refugees from non-communist coun-
tries is the assumption on the part of the INS that they have come
to the United States to seek work rather than asylum. As a result,
claims of persecution, however severe the physical manifestations,
are underplayed or discounted as self-serving statements. In a re-
cent case,57 the court deemed suicide alone as insufficient to prove
fear of persecution. "The suicide of one [claimant] and attempted
suicide of another is not, without more, and contrary to petitioners'
contention, evidence of their fear or indicative that their fear is well-
founded or politically motivated. . .. This is especially true where
so many Haitians come to this country seeking economic relief."-"
The court assumed that Haitians come to the United States primar-
ily to improve their economic position, and therefore cast a jaun-
diced eye toward claims of other motivations. This fact, coupled
with the difficulty of substantiating and documenting claims of
persecution, places Haitian claimants at a severe disadvantage.
Neither the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees nor the Protocol" disqualifies an alien merely for seeking
53. 432 F.2d at 834, 849.
54. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1955).
55. Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954).
56. 234 F.2d at 718. The court stated that:
since life and liberty are here at stake, this court may reconsider its previous
decision in the Moon case, if it now appears that there we overlooked any significant
factor ....
The Attorney General. . . found as a fact that appellant would not be 'subject
to physical persecution' by the Chinese Communist government.
Id. "On the basis of a fact which we know judicially, an administrative determination of the
contrary fact is arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 719. The court also noted that since the Moon
case Fort osa was no long'r accepting refugees, so appellant would have to go to Communist
China. Ic'. at 720.
57. Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 201 (5th Cir. 1975).
58. Id. at 201 (citation omitted).
59. U.N. Refugee Convention & Protocol, supra note 5.
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employment or refuge in a particular country, so long as the alien
nevertheless has a well-founded fear of persecution upon return to
the home country. The argument that an analogous standard should
be applied in the United States has been made and rejected." Many
thousands of Cuban refugees were members of the professional and
merchant classes,"' and may have sought entry for economic reasons
as well; that is, to retain the privileges which they had enjoyed in
Cuba prior to Castro's revolution. The "economic relief" rationale
has not, however, been used to exclude these refugees."
A second aspect of the economic disadvantage issue concerns
the judicial attitude toward assertions that a claimant returned to
his home country would be subjected to menial labor because of his
political views. In Kasravi v. INS,63 the petitioner, an Iranian stu-
dent vociferous in his opposition to the Shah, claimed he would be
unable to obtain work in the film industry or a related area if re-
turned to Iran. The court found this claim insufficient insofar as he
had shown "no more than economic disadvantage."" In Berdo v.
INS, 5 however, the court was influenced by claimant's contention
that he had been demoted, reduced in pay, and assigned menial
tasks "inconsistent with his skill as a mechanic" because of his
reluctance to join the Hungarian Communist Party."6 Similarly, in
Kovac v. INS, 7 a Yugoslav crewman claimed that when he refused
to cooperate with the police, his employment was terminated and
he was unable to procure another position for which he was trained.
He testified that "the reason he ceased working on shore and started
working on ships was to obtain a home for his family."" The court
60. Brief for Appellant at 42, Pierre V. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977).
61. L. HoI SOaN, Rzrucus: A Piosau or Ou TmE 582, 588 (1975).
62. See R. FAGzN, CUSmNS w ExiLz (1968). "Both critics and defenders of the Cuban
revolution agree that those who have left the island do not represent a cross section of the
total population. ... [I]t is obvious to almost all concerned that a disproportionate number
of refugees come from the middle and upper strata of prerevolutionary society." Id. at 16.
Although Fagen cautions against simplistic socio-economic conclusions, his data on the moti-
vation of Cubans in coming to the United States bears out the hypothesis that retention of
privilege was a significant factor. For example, an occupational comparison of the Cuban
work force and Cuban refugees revealed that professional and semi-professional persons are
overrepresented among the exiles. Id. at 19, Table 2.1. Furthermore, actual threat of political
pesecution-including imprisonment, disruption of daily life, and harrassment due to failure
to integrate into the revolution-accounted for the primary motivation of less than half of
the responding exiles. Id. at 90, Table 6.2.
63. 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
64. Id. at 676.
65. 432 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1970).
66. Id. at 827.
67. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
68. Id. at 107.
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found this to be consistent with his claim of persecution." It ap-
pears, then, that evidence of economic disadvantage carries greater
weight in establishing political persecution when the persecuting
government is communist in nature.
C. Political Activity in the United States
In the cases of political refugees claiming to fear persecution
resulting from activities within the United States in opposition to
their native regimes, the courts have consistently denied refugee
status to claimants from non-communist countries. In denying re-
lief, the courts have relied upon statements or opinion letters from
the State Department assessing the probability of persecution in a
given country. In the case of Iranian students opposed to the Shah,
these letters have expressed the view that such students have partic-
ipated in anti-Shah activities "solely in order to make a case for
staying their deportation."7 The letters invariably contain the view
that "opposition to the Shah's regime without more does not subject
an individual to persecution, whether the opposition occurred in
Iran or abroad."'" This view is sustained despite the acknowledge-
ment that "[t]here is no doubt that respondent has been promi-
nently involved in this movement [opposition to the Shah] and it
seems likely that he is known as a participant by the government
of Iran."
'72
In contrast are decisions involving refugees from communist
countries who after arrival in the United States have criticized the
regime in their home country. One such case73 involved a Czechoslo-
vakian claimant who was a voluntary member of the Communist
Party. Claiming to have initially doubted Party goals after the Hun-
garian uprising, he propagandized against his government after ar-
riving in the United States. He gave interviews critical of the Czech
regime to the FBI, Radio Free Europe and the Czech language press.
In upholding his claim the Board stated, "[we have little doubt
that at least some, if not all, of these facts are known to the Czech
government.""7 Unlike cases involving Iranian opposition to the
Shah, the Board did not here suggest that the claimant had fabri-
cated his opposition solely to make a case for staying deportation.
69. Id.
70. Hosseinmardi v. INS, 405 F.2d 25, 27 (9th Cir. 1968).
71. Kojoory, 12 I. & N. Dec. 215, 218 (1967).
72. Id. at 217.
73. Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968).
74. id. at 871.
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In both cases the Board acknowledged that the claimants' political
activities within the United States were known to the home govern-
ment. Yet the two cases reached different results, at least in part
because in the Iranian case the Board impliedly accepted the State
Department view that dissidents would not be persecuted," while
in the Czech case the Board's perception of the Czech government"'
led to the conclusion that persecution would occur if the claimants
were deported."
Another comparison of a case involving a Czech with one in-
volving an Iranian illustrates that political activity within the
United States may disqualify an otherwise eligible person from asy-
lum. In In re Zedkova,7' a claimant who departed Czechoslovakia
voluntarily and for personal reasons, deciding not to return home
after the Russian invasion of 1968, was found eligible for conditional
entry. To achieve this eligibility, the court construed the require-
ment in section 203(a)(7) of the Act concerning actual flight to
include one who has avoided, abandoned or forsaken a danger or
evil.
The Board declined to apply this construction in the case of In
re Taheri,7' which involved an Iranian student. The claimant, who
had indulged in vehement activity against the Shah within the
United States, contended that he, like Zedkova, had "fled"" within
the meaning of the conditional entry provision, insofar as interven-
75. Kojoory, 12 I. & N. Dec. at 219. In addition, Kojoory was chapter president of the
outlawed Iranian Student Association and had picketed the Shah during his visit to the
United States in 1964. Such activities are clearly more of an embarrassment to the American
government than the giving of an anti-communist interview to Radio Free Europe.
76. Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d at 847. The court referred to the Board's statement that
Communist Party line was stronger in Czechoslovakia than in Hungary and that one of the
controlling factors that justified the different results reached in the Janek case was that Janek
was Czech and Berdo was Hungarian. Id.
77. In Berdo petitioner publicly admitted after his departure from Hungary that he had
killed a Russian soldier in the street fighting which occured during the 1956 uprising. The
court concluded that based on this statement petitioner would be subject to imprisonment if
returned to Hungary. Although such trial and punishment had indeed become a probability
as a result of the public admission, the court did not discuss the fact that the Hungarian
authorities had not acted on this incident from 1956 to 1964, probably because they had no
knowledge of the facts of the incident prior to Berdo's admission while he was in the United
States.
78. 13 I. & N. Dec. 626 (1970).
79. 14 I. & N. Dec. 27 (1972).
80. The applicant stated that:
I fled from Iran, within the meaning of Matter of Zedkova,. . . I have taken part
in the activities of the Confederation of Iranian Students. The Confederation was
recently outlawed by the Iranian Government. I have also been arrested for an anti-
Iranian Government demonstration at the Consulate of Iran in San Francisco.
14 I. & N. Dec. at 28.
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ing events had rendered return to his home country impossible. The
Regional Commissioner initially held the case distinguishable on
the ground that Iran, unlike Czechoslovakia, had not been invaded
by a foreign country.8' The District Court remanded the case for
reconsideration on the ground that the commissioner's distinction
was one of detail rather than principle." It was ultimately held that
in invading the Iranian consulate in San Francisco, the claimant
had been involved in criminal acts violative of United States law,
thus providing a rational basis for denial of his application.s This
holding ignored specific provisions of the Act which define those
criminal offenses resulting in deportation, and which exclude crimes
such as those committed by the claimant." The Board, then, failing
to apply the standard established in Zedkova, denied asylum on the
basis of a minor criminal conviction directly resulting from the
claimant's political protest at the Iranian consulate.
D. The Problems in Evidence
Rules of evidence are not applicable to deportation hearings. U
By administrative regulation, a determination of deportability is
invalid unless clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence demon-
strates the truth of the facts alleged as grounds for deportation."
However, an individual applying for waiver of deportation bears the
burden of showing a well-founded fear of persecution." As discussed
hereinafter, this burden is especially difficult for refugees from non-
communist countries to sustain because judicial evaluation of evi-
81. Id. at 29.
82. Id. at 34.
83. Id.
84. Claimant plead guilty to a charge of false imprisonment and served thrity-five days
in jail. Id. at 28. An alien commits a deportable offense where he is
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after
entry and either sentenced to confinement or confined therefor in a prison or correc-
tive institution for a year or more, or who at any time after entry is convicted of
two crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out a single scheme of criminal
misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the
convictions were in a single trial.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 9 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1970). Whether
the section is applicable to the particular charge involved is questionable, in that there was
no indication that Taheri's crimes involved "moral turpitude." Moreover, the court did not
even cite this section, but relied instead on the bare fact of conviction to deny refugee status
to Taheri.
85. Bufalino v. Holland, 277 F.2d 270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1960).
86. 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1977).
87. Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003
(1968).
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dence may differ according to the government accused.
Courts will more likely take judicial notice of unfavorable polit-
ical conditions in the home country of a claimant from a communist
nation perceived as an adversary of the United States. In the case
of a Chinese refugee for example, the court stated,
I think we can and should take judicial notice of the notorious and
virtually indisputable fact of the ruthless behavior of the Com-
munist governments in China and Russia, so that almost surely a
Chinese, known to have. allied himself with the Formosa govern-
ment, will be tortured and exterminated if found on the mainland
of China."
In a case involving Haitians fleeing the Duvalier regime, on the
other hand, the court refused to take such notice. "To require the
INS to take administrative notice of conditions in Haiti would con-
fer 'blanket asylum status'[" ] on those who are not in fact political
refugees."10
The doctrine of judicial notice in immigration cases poses in-
herent dangers by providing a means for the judges' political percep-
tions to influence the outcome at the claimant's expense. In the
foregoing cases, Chinese claimants were essentially defined as bona
fide refugees because of the court's perception of conditions in
China, while Haitians were denied the benefit of judicial notice as
a means of proving fear of persecution.
A second evidentiary problem involves statements by claimants
and witnesses supporting an application for asylum. Refugees fre-
quently arrive in the United States without documentation of their
claims of persecution other than their own affidavits of personal
experience. Many Haitians, for example, arrive by night in small
boats" with little knowledge of English, and with neither the money
nor the opportunity to obtain counsel prior to an interview with an
Immigration Officer. Statements made upon arrival regarding their
purpose for coming to the United States may be misconstrued and
later used against them. Fearing the Immigration Officer, some
88. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1955).
89. The court's concern with the obligation to confer blanket asylum status is misplaced.
Even where judicial notice of conditions in Haiti is taken, claimants may still be burdened
by ambiguous evidentiary standards. See Hyppolite v. INS, 382 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1967).
90. Anderson, The Haitians of New York, NEw YoaKaa MAGAZINE, March 31, 1975, at
60, as quoted in Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1975). In an earlier case, Hyppolite
v. INS, 382 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1967), the Special Inquiry Officer took judicial notice of condi-
tions in.Haiti, but found that petitioner had not sustained her burden of proof by showing
that she would be persecuted for her political opinions. Id. at 100.
91. Brief for Appellant at 6, 7, Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977).
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have initially stated that their purpose was to find employment.
When they later submit affidavits of political persecution, these
affidavits are dismissed as self serving.2
Those claimants able to present the testimony of one or more
expert witnesses discover that the weight accorded such testimony
may differ depending upon the official State Department position
on conditions within the claimant's home country. In re KojoolyU
illustrates this double standard. The Board therein recognized that
the Iranian government was probably aware of petitioner's activities
in opposition to the Shah. Claimant's expert witness, who had
worked on a high level with the government of Iran,"1 stressed that
Iran was a police state lacking civil liberties. He testified that the
secret police organization (SAVAK) had considerable power to im-
prison and even kill people without answering to higher authority. s
However, a State Department letter maintained that opposition to
the Shah's regime does not subject an individual to persecution.N
The Board thereafter rejected Kojoory's claim. 7
An opposite result was reached in a case involving a refugee
from Communist Hungary.8 Petitioner's expert witness was a fellow
Hungarian emigre, employed as a legal specialist in the European
Law Division of the Library of Congress. He testified that peti-
tioner's recent admission that he had killed a Russian soldier would
result in a trial for murder, conspiracy, and counter-revolutionary
activities. This testimony had not persuaded the Board, but did
persuade the court."
In some instances, judicial assumptions regarding the nature of
certain governments have led to rejection of even those affidavits
submitted by an agency of the United States government. In Fong
Foo v. Shaughnessy,'" the court, having taken judicial notice of
communist cruelty, discounted the affidavit of an INS attorney
stating that Chinese who had been deported to communist China
"were not there molested.""'1 The court replied, "[niote the vague-
92. Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d at 201.
93. 12 I. & N. Dec. 215 (1967).
94. The witness, a Dr. Norton Kristy, had worked with an oil consortium and the govern-
ment of Iran in the making of overall plans for the development of Iran. Id. at 218.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 219-20. Accord Hosseinmardi v. INS, 405 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1968).
98. Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1970).
99. Id. at 847.
100. 234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1955).
101. Id. at 720.
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ness of that statement. Affiant does not say whether those persons
were anti-Communists."''0 In protecting the escapee from Com-
munism, then, the court accorded greater weight to selected evi-
dence in order to achieve the desired result.
While the claimant from China profited from judicial skepti-
cism, an absence of uniform standards regarding admissibility of
evidence impacts adversely upon claimants from non-communist
countries. In a case upholding a deportation order against a Haitian,
the dissent noted that the Immigration Judge made no credibility
findings: "[ilf the statements, or substantial parts of them, are
accepted as credible, the conclusion that petitioners failed to meet
the burden of proof is, to put it baldly, astonishing. Yet the Immi-
gration Judge made no credibility findings-indeed his finding...
implies that he accepted petitioners' statements as true."3 Thus,
in the absence of clear evidentiary rules, judicial bias, either per-
sonal or political, may intervene to prejudice the rights of claimants
from non-communist states.
A third obstacle facing claimants from non-communist coun-
tries is the District Director's ability to request State Department
opinion letters on the likelihood that an individual will be perse-
cuted if deported. 0' By established Service practice, the petitioner
in such cases is not permitted to cross-examine or to submit the
Department of State to discovery procedures.'"
Some courts have recognized the problem inherent in such evi-
dence. The Ninth Circuit has stated:
[s]uch letters from the State Department do not carry the guaran-
tees of reliability which the law demands of admissible evidence.
A frank, but official, discussion of the political shortcomings of a
friendly nation is not always compatible with the high duty to
maintain advantageous diplomatic relations with nations through-
out the world. The traditional foundation required of expert testi-
mony is lacking; nor can official position be said to supply an
acceptable substitute. No hearing officer or court has the means
to know the diplomatic necessities of the moment, in light of which
the statements must be weighed.'
102. Id.
103. Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d at 202, 204.
104. 8 C.F.R. § 108.2 (1977) provides that "[the district director shall request the views
of the Department of State before making his decision unless in his opinion the application
is clearly meritorious or clearly lacking in substance."
105. Hosseinmardi v. INS, 405 F.2d at 28.
106. Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968).
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Although acknowledging the inherent unreliability of such letters,
the court nevertheless admitted them into evidence. In another case
decided earlier in the same year, the Ninth Circuit had stated:
"[tihis advice came from a knowledgeable and competent source
and was admissible . . . .
The Second Circuit, elucidating the prejudicial effect of such
letters, has stated that the danger exists because "[t]hey do both
too little and too much . . . . [They] give little or nothing about
conditions in the foreign country. What they do is to recommend
how the district director should decide the particular petitioner's
request for asylum."' 8 Although recognizing the problems inherent
in admitting these letters into evidence, the court conditioned rever-
sal upon petitioner's ability to "show some likelihood that it [the
letter] influenced the result."'0 The court further stated that in this
case such reliance was expressly disclaimed by the Immigration
Judge, although not by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Thus,
once the unreliability of an opinion letter is recognized, the peti-
tioner's claim may nevertheless be prejudiced by a subjective find-
ing that the administrative officer did not rely upon the letter.
This emphasis upon subjective reliance can raise additional
problems. In one case involving an Iranian student, for example, the
court stated:
[t]he Board mentioned only one of the statements in the letter
(that students returning to Iran after anti-regime activity abroad
had not been subject to persecution, without additional action on
their part), but. . . the thrust of the Board's decision was that the
petitioner's own evidence was insufficient to discharge his burden
of establishing that he would be persecuted if deported to Iran."'
The court thereby inferred that there had been no reliance on the
107. Asghari v. INS, 396 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 1968). In Francois, I. & N. Interim Dec.
No. 2458 (Dec. 15, 1975), the Board acknowledged the questionable reliability of the letters
but refused to approve their universal exclusion from deportation proceedings, as "[the
Department of State may have access to information regarding the conditions in a foreign
country which may not be available from any other source. These letters can be particularly
useful if they contain specific information relating directly to the alien whose case is being
adjudicated." Id. at 3. Although the Board did not contend that the letters in question related
directly to the claimant and conceded that they may have had little probative value, it
concluded that such issues should go to the weight and not the admissibility of the letters as
evidence. Id. at 3-4.
108. Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1063 (2d Cir. 1976).
109. Id.
110. Hosseinmardi v. INS, 405 F.2d at 28.
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letter although these letters would appear to carry considerable
weight in such cases."'
E. The Narrow Definition of Political Oppression
Under a narrow definition of political oppression, political acts
are viewed as criminal offenses when committed by refugees from
non-communist states. However, if refugees from communist coun-
tries have been convicted of a "political crime," their chances for
asylum are increased." 2 If departure from the home country is politi-
cally motivated and if any consequences are political in nature,
although taking the form of criminal penalties, criminal conviction
does not preclude a favorable exercise of discretion."3
On the other hand, those who commit crimes against non-
communist states are viewed as criminal, rather than political, of-
fenders. In In re Taheri,"' claimant, a member of an anti-Shah
student organization, invaded the Iranian consulate in San Fran-
cisco and was convicted under United States law. Subsequently,
Iran announced that members of the Confederation of Iranian Stu-
dents would be subject to prosecution in Iran."' In denying asylum,
the Board viewed the invasion of the consulate as a criminal, rather
than political, offense."' Moreover, the Board failed to seriously
consider the announced prosecution under Iranian law for member-
ship in the student organization.
A further illustration of the difficulty in defining the nature of
a political offense is demonstrated by In re Maccaud. 11 Before his
last entry into the United States and during imprisonment in Can-
ada, claimant had aided fellow prisoners in developing an aware-
ness, and promoting the exercise, of their rights under Canadian
111. A further illustration of the way in which State Department opinion influences
judicial decisions is found in Chukumerije, I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2453 (Nov. 26, 1975)
(involving a Nigerian who had been determined to be a bona fide refugee by the delegation
in Belgium of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees). The Board indicated that
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ceases to apply if the person is able to
return to his country or former habitual residence as a result of changed circumstances. The
Board's decision upholding deportation was based entirely on a State Department communi-
cation which pointed out that "[in January, 1970, at the conclusion of the [Biafran] war,
the Federal Military Government declared a general amnesty, inviting Nigerians living
abroad to return, and announced a policy of reconciliation and reintegration of Nigerians
(mostly Tbos) who had supported the secession." Id. at 4.
112. Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
113. Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968).
114. 14 1. & N. Dec. 27 (1972).
115. Id. at 39.
116. Id. at 40.
117. 14 I. & N. Dec. 429 (1973).
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law. Some of these prisoners were members of the Quebec Libera-
tion Front (FLQ). Claimant alleged that because of his political
activity he was beaten by prison guards"' and would be subjected
to similar ill treatment if returned to Canada. The Board rejected
his contentions, stating: "[tihere is nothing in the record which
shows that respondent has been or will be persecuted because of this
tenuous association with the FLQ," and concluding that "[i]f he
is prosecuted when he returns to Canada . . .[s]uch prosecution
does not seem to be politically motivated.""'1 The Board failed to
take notice of the fact that in 1970, the concern of the authorities
regarding the existence and political orientation of the FLQ resulted
in the declaration of martial law.12 Hundreds of people were impris-
oned for just such tenuous associations with the Quebec Liberation
Front.'2 The Board, deeming claimant an escaped convict, ignored
the beatings he suffered in prison directly resulting from his politi-
cal activities. In
A second problem in narrowly defining political oppression is
the resulting inability to perceive behavior of refugees from non-
communist states as politically motivated, while reaching the op-
posite conclusion with respect to refugees from communist states.
In re Pierre'23 involved a Haitian woman who claimed that her hus-
band, a deputy in the Duvalier government, had threatened her life.
In applying for asylum, she contended that because of his high
political position she would be effectively foreclosed from receiving
adequate legal or physical protection in Haiti. Claimant argued that
this abuse of authority amounted to persecution unrestrained by the
Haitian government. In rejecting her claim, the Board characterized
the motivation behind her husband's actions as strictly personal
rather than as an expression of governmental oppression based on
118. The guards were prosecuted, but acquitted. Id. at 434.
119. Id.
120. Prime Minister Trudeau invoked the emergency War Measures Act Oct.
16 [19701 to deal with terrorist kidnappings. It was the first occasion the act had
been invoked in peace time and gave sweeping powers to the federal government.
It also suspended the operation of the Canadian Bill of Rights ....
Under the emergency act, the FLQ was outlawed, and anyone who abetted the
FLQ also became liable ... [Tihe act suspended civil liberties for many mem-
bers and supporters of the militant separatist group and for possible witnesses in
investigations.
D. RisEBOROUGH, CANADA AND THE FRNCH 197 (1975).
121. Id. at 199.
122. The Board decision was affirmed in Maccaud v. INS, 500 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1975),
the court accepting the view of the Canadian government that it would not countenance any
harrassment. Id. at 359.
123. I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2433 (Sept. 16, 1975).
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race, religion or political opinion." ' This result was contrary to dicta
in a previous decision approving the concept that non-governmental
persecution could be included within the ambit of section 243(h) of
the Act.2 5 The Board failed to recognize that although the hus-
band's motives may have been personal, the woman's oppression
was in essence political. Her husband's governmental position al-
lowed him to threaten her life without fear of sanction.
Similarly, in Gena v. INS,121 the court adopted the hearing
officer's statement that claimant "fears only the action of one per-
son in the TonTon Macoute, (the Haitian secret police), [who]
apparently became enamoured of the respondent's wife and sought
to take advantage of his position to harass or incarcerate respon-
dent."'" The court apparently failed to realize that neither individ-
ual nor political rights can exist if a semi-official police agency
member is allowed to use official status to harass and intimidate
citizens with impunity in their most intimate relationships. n
The above-mentioned courts rejected claims of persecution be-
cause the claimants feared only one person and this fear was person-
ally motivated. The result was different, however, in Loi Leung v.
INS,'2 involving a Chinese crewman and resident of Hong Kong
who asserted a claim of political refugee status. The court reversed
the Board's rejection of his claim on the ground that the Board had
erred in disregarding a proffered affidavit. Claimant therein stated
that he had jumped ship because of threats from "a 'member' of the
'Communist' Seaman's Union provoked by Loi Leung's expression
of his anti-communist views."' '3 It appears, then, that if a claimant
fears one individual, that fear is unlikely to be construed as politi-
cally motivated unless the feared individual is a communist. A nar-
row definition of political persecution combined with a restrictive
judicial attitude towards evidence presented by refugees from non-
communist countries substantially limits relief to these refugees
under current provisions of the Act.
124. Id.
125. Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 567 (1967).
126. 424 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970).
127. Id. at 230.
128. "Haiti's 'tranquility' is largely a surface phenomenon .. repression and officially
sanctioned terrorism--carried out by the dreaded TonTons Macoutes and a newer, U.S.
trained force called the Leopards-remain the order of the day." 91 CRIMr COMruny 219
(Feb. 27, 1974), cited in Dernis, supra note 48, at 29.
129. 531 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1976).
130. Id. at 168.
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F. Sovereign Rights and the Constitution
Generally, alien applicants claiming political persecution are
afforded limited constitutional protection because their entry into
the United States continues to be viewed not as a right, but as a
privilege which can be conditioned or withdrawn.'"' The inequity of
this concept is reflected in Galvan v. Press,13 wherein a Mexican
living in the United States for over thirty years was deported be-
cause he had been a member of the Communist Party from 1944 to
1946. Membership in the Party did not constitute a specific ground
for deportation until passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950.'3
Thus, as Justice Douglas emphasized in his dissent, the only charge
against this alien was an act which was lawful when performed.1u
The deportation order was upheld on the rationale that policy for-
mulation regulating alien entry is peculiarly concerned with govern-
mental political conduct and entrusted exclusively to Congress, con-
stitutional embarrassments notwithstanding.1'3
Limitations of the Act are accentuated when the provisions are
compared with those of the United Nations Convention and Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees.'1 The Convention provides
a substantive right of "non-refoulement" (non-return) for a bona
fide refugee.'3 In contrast to the Immigration and Nationality Act,
this right is not conditioned on a requirement of actual flight, there
is no limitation on the type of government or part of the world
involved, and there is no disqualifying concept of resettlement.1s
131. Although the right-privilege distinction has been abandoned in other areas of the
law, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), it still prevades alienage cases. See Pierre
v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281, 1287 (5th Cir. 1977).
132. 347 U.S. 522 (1954). Although Galvan is not an asylum case, it illustrates the
extreme deference to political mandate in alienage cases, and has never been expressly over-
ruled.
133. 64 Stat. 987, 1006, 1008 (1950).
134. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. at 533 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 530-31.
136. U.N. Refugee Convention & Protocol, supra note 5.
137. Article 32 provides that "[tjhe Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully
in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order." U.N. Refugee Conven-
tion & Protocol, supra note 5, art. 32, 19 U.S.T. 6275, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 at 53, 189 U.N.T.S.
174.
Similarly, Article 33 mandates that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion." 19 U.S.T. 6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 at 54, 189
U.N.T.S. 176.
138. A judically imposed requirement for applicants under § 203(a)(7) of the Act, as
amended, (8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970)), is that the claimant must not have resettled in some
other country since fleeing his homeland. Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971).
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Limitations inherent in the Act and imposed through judicial
interpretation have resulted in the assertion of constitutional argu-
ments during recent years. Moreover, the United Nations Conven-
tion and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees were acceded
to by the Senate in 1968. It has been argued that Articles 32 and 33
thereby have the force and effect of law, vesting in aliens certain
rights presently unavailable under the Act.
139
In Pierre v. United States, 0 petitioners argued that Article 33
of the Convention creates an absolute right of "non-refoulement"
(non-return) vesting in refugees a conditional liberty right protected
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."' The Fifth
Circuit, however, dismissed these contentions, holding that Article
33 does not deprive the INS of its discretion to exclude refugees,",
and vests no liberty right in the alien."' This interpretation is prob-
lematic in two respects.
First, in reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the legisla-
tive history regarding the accession to the Protocol. However, the
court misconstrued this history as requiring no change in the admin-
istration of immigration policy. The Board has similarly concluded
that the Senate did not contemplate effectuation of radical change
in existing immigration laws."' In fact, general representations to
induce affirmative Senate action indicated that our immigration
laws already embodied the humane provisions for refugees fostered
by the Convention and Protocol." 5 President Johnson, in forwarding
the Protocol to the Senate for approval, stated as fact that "most
refugees in this country already enjoy the protection and rights
which the Protocol seeks to secure for refugees in all countries."",
Yet these representations regarding the scope of the Protocol were
and are factually inaccurate. As discussed above, the Protocol is
broader than the Act, its application would eliminate many prob-
139. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 45, 49, Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th
Cir. 1977).
140. 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977).
141. Id. at 1287.
142. Id. Interestingly, James L. Carlin, of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs,
Department of State, in refering to the right of non-refoulment under Article 33, has implied
that the Attorney General's discretion has been limited by accession to the Protocol: "the
discretionary authority of the Attorney General under section 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act is now qualified and fortified since our accession to the Protocol in 1968...
by this mandatory prohibition against refoulement." Carlin, supra note 3, at 20.
143. 547 F.2d at 1289-90.
144. Id. at 1288, citing Dunar, I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2192 (Apr. 17, 1973).
145. 547 F.2d at 1288.
146. 114 CONG. Rzc. 24628 (1968).
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lems presently faced by refugees from non-communist nations.
Second, the court in Pierre mistakenly relied upon decisions of
the Second and Third Circuits' 7 in holding that Article 33 vests no
rights in the alien. These decisions turned on the issue of whether
lawful presence in the United States is a prerequisite to relief under
Article 32 of the Convention, not whether Article 33 creates an abso-
lute, substantive right of non-return.1
Although law relating to the effect of the Convention and Proto-
col is evolving on a case-by-case basis, current cases portend a trend
toward bringing the treaties within the Act, rather than changing
the Act to conform with the intent of the treaties. In In re
Francois,"' the Board recognized that relief under Article 33 does
not depend on the refugee's lawful presence.150 The significance of
that conclusion was undermined by a finding that, although the
claimant might apply for relief, he had not met his burden of proof
on the persecution claim under section 243(h). The Board stated
that the murder of the claimant's father, step-father and other
members of the family by the Duvalier regime, and the burning of
the family home were not indicative of any interest on the part of
the government in the claimant himself.15'
In Kashani v. INS, 52 this elusive standard of proof again de-
stroyed the claim of an Iranian applicant. The claimant asserted
that under section 243(h) and the Protocol, the Attorney General
has discretion only in determining whether the claimant's state of
mind regarding fear of persecution is reasonable. The court rejected
this contention, reasoning that "the 'well-founded fear' standard
contained in the Protocol and the 'clear probability' standard which
this court has engrafted onto section 243(h) will in practice con-
147. 547 F.2d at 1288, citing Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673 (F.D.N.Y. 1973), affl'd,
505 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1974); and Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp. 177 (D.N.J. 1973),
aff'd, 493 F.2d 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
148. Id. Representatives of other Haitian claimants enjoyed a brief victory a few days
prior to the decision in Pierre. In Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Fla. 1977),
the court held that an asylum claim under Article 33 of the Protocol constitutes an assertion
of a privilege to enter and as such can be litigated in exclusion proceedings and appealed to
the Board. The court asserted that the distinctions drawn in 8 C.F.R. § 108 between excluda-
ble and deportable aliens find no justification in the Protocol or in logic, and place the
excludable alien at a disadvantage by providing only a summary and nor-appealable proce-
dure to adjudicate his claim. The case was remanded to provide the Haitians a full and fair
adversary hearing. 427 F. Supp. at 1276-77. Unfortunately, the contra holding in Pierre, as a
decision of the Fifth Circuit, is binding on the Sannon court.
149. 1. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2458 (Dec. 15, 1975).
150. Id. at 6.
151. Id. at 6-7.
152. 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977).
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verge.' 51 3 In effect, then, the claimant under the Protocol must meet
the more stringent requirements of section 243(h).
Although persons held deportable may now apparently raise
Article 33 claims, the Board has not allowed such claims by
excludable aliens. In re Cenatice'54 is a recent example of this posi-
tion. In Cenatice, the Board held that Article 33 claims could not
be raised in an exclusion proceeding because, as a prerequisite to
raising such a claim, an alien must have effected an "entry" into
the United States'5 which, by definition, never occurs in an exclu-
sion case.'S5
The applicants then argued that to deny hearing of refugee
claims in exclusion proceedings was violative of due process and
equal protection under the Fifth Amendment, and that their exclu-
sion and subsequent deportation would constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.'57 Stating that it
was not within its province to pass on the constitutionality of the
statutes, the Board nonetheless noted that excludable aliens are not
entitled to equal protection or due process.1 5s The claim of right to
counsel was denied on the same basis; moreover, it was noted that
the right to counsel may not apply to preliminary investigations.' 5'
The appeal was dismissed.
The reason for this apparent reluctance to probe the substan-
tive issues involved lies in the Fifth Circuit's admission that:
153. Id. at 379.
154. I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2571 (Mar. 28, 1977). In Cenatice, thirteen Haitians arrived
by boat in Miami and applied for admission as refugees. They were detained under § 235(b)
of the Act (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1970)), which provides that "[elvery alien ... who may not
appear to the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to land shall be detained for further inquiry ...." In spite of the explicit
requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 235.6(a) that the aliens immediately be given notice of referral to
an immigration judge, this was not done for eleven months, during which time the Haitians
remained in detention. Despite the Immigration Judge's recitation that the applicants had
applied to the district director for asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 108.1, copies of the applications
and decision denying their claim did not appear in the record.
155. The Board reiterated that detention of an alien pending a determination of admissi-
bility does not legally constitute an entry and that relief under § 243(h) is unavailable. I. &
N. Interim Dec. No. 2571 at 5. E.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958). The
only permissible procedure for asylum is that found in 8 C.F.R. 108.1 & 108.2, and a decision
thereunder is not appealable to the Board.
Turning to the question of the unavailability at an exclusion proceeding of a refugee
claim under Article 33, the Board cited Pierre, in reiterating that it was the intent of Congress
that existing procedures be followed, and that such claims could not be raised at an exclusion
hearing. I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2571 at 8.
156. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
157. I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2571 at 8-9.
158. Id. at 9.
159. Id.
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Congress clearly has the power to draw distinctions between
classes of aliens which, if drawn among classes of citizens, would
appear to violate the equal protection clause or other constitu-
tional rights ....
In light of the established power of Congress to make such
distinctions among classes of aliens, the question becomes whether
Congress or its delegates abuse that power when making a distinc-
tion between the class of aliens who have made entry and those
who have not. Clearly constitutional protections cannot be af-
forded to the entire population of the world, and some distinction
is necessary . . . . We decline to upset this distinction which lies
within the jurisdiction of the political branches of government.'"0
CONCLUSION
In the twenty-five years since Justice Frankfurter acknowl-
edged the cruelty of our immigration laws,'' little has changed. The
courts continue to defer to the plenary power of Congress to decide
who may or may not enter, notwithstanding consequential injury to
refugees from non-communist states. Judicial deference to the polit-
ical branches of government has resulted in an abdication of the
duty to review constitutional issues involving political refugees, and
has thereby rendered the Constitution subordinate to foreign policy
interests. While the courts decline to interfere with the political
branch, the political and executive departments exercise discretion
in a prejudicial manner with a minimum of accountability. Such
discretion may take the form of executive exercise of the parole
power or State Department opinion letters reflecting foreign policy
considerations rather than the objective danger to individual refu-
gees.'6 2 A more subtle danger to political refugees is the judiciary's
own perceptions and biases as to world politics.
Recent Congressional reform initiatives'" have failed to pro-
160. Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d at 1290.
161. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
162. See Taheri, 14 I. & N. Dec. 27 (1972) where the Office of Refugee and Migration
Affairs urged that the applications for refugee status by foreign students who came originally
to the United States not for political asylum but for education be examined with extreme
care for policy reasons; Tayeb, 12 1. & N. Dec. 739 (1968) where relief was denied on the basis
of State Department advice that the approval of the application -would have an adverse effect
on relations with the Government of Libya; Nghiem, 11 1. & N. Dec. 541 (1966) where
claimant opposed the Diem and Khanh regimes in South Vietnam. The Agency for Interna-
tional Development requested the enforced departure of respondent Nghiem, even though
that constituted an exception to the then current policy of not requiring departure of appli-
cants pending completion of the exchange visitor program.
163. On May 7, 1976, Rep. Eilberg of Pennsylvania introduced legislation to reform
United States refugee policy and procedures. Mr. Eilberg complained that "the entire proce-
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duce serious changes in basic assumptions regarding the nature of
political oppression. Unless and until that questioning and re-
evaluation process occurs, political refugees in general, and refugees
from non-communist states in particular, will continue to be sub-
jected to capricious and arbitrary treatment.
Jana Zimmer*
dure is completely arbitrary. and "decisions to admit certain categories of refugees are
too often based on: Foreign policy considerations, pressures from special interest groups, or
the positions of small numbers of individuals within the executive branch, or for that matter
within the Congress." 122 CONG. Rac. H4112 (daily ed. May 7, 1976). The proposed bill would
adopt, with slight modification, the Protocol definition of refugees and would authorize the
admission of 20,000 refugees annually. Id. at H4113. See 54 INTERPRETER RELEASEs 100-01
(1977). On February 22, 1977, H.R. 3056 was reintroduced and set for hearing on February
24, 1977.
However, due to "considerable opposition ... from both the government and the private
sector" to certain provisions of H.R. 3056, Rep. Eilberg introduced a "clean" version of the
bill, H.R. 7175, on May 13, 1977. 123 CONG. Rac. H4448 (daily ed. May 13, 1977); 55
INTERPRE ER RELEASES 4 (1978). See generally 54 INTEPagrER RELEAsEs 296 (1977).
While the bill purports to reform the procedures for entry of refugees, the additional
Congressional controls proposed in H.R. 7175 would only serve to exacerbate the problems of
refugees from non-communist states.
First, while the new bill would permit relief to refugees from non-communist persecution
under the conditional entry provision of the Act, the overall quota for political refugees would
only be increased to 20,000 per year. This increase of 14.9 percent from the present yearly
maximum would not accomodate the newly eligible class of refugees. Statement of William
Waterman, Jr., on behalf of the National Lawyers' Guild, Hearings on H.R. 7175 Before the
House Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in 7 IMIGRATION N.wsLzraa Mar.-Apr.
1978 at 11.
Second, the bill would add a new subparagraph, 243(h)(2)(A), which would deprive the
Attorney General of discretion to withhold deportation of aliens within the United States who
have effected an illegal entry. Id. at 10.
Third, proposed new section 207(a)(3)(B) bars the admission of a refugee where "the
alien's primary motivation for seeking admission under this subsection is improvement of his
economic condition." Id. at 11.
The two latter provisions are inconsistent with the intent of Article 33 of the Protocol,
see note 137 supra, and would operate to codify the existing prejudicial approach toward
political refugees from repressive non-communist regimes.
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